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CONSTITUTIONAL NEWSPEAK: LEARNING TO LOVE THE AFFORDABLE CARE
ACT DECISION

A. ChristopherBryant*
Abstract

In his classic dystopian novel, 1984, George Orwell imagines a world in
which language is regularly contorted to mean its opposite - as in the waging
of war by the Ministry of Peace and infliction of torture by the Ministry of
Love. A core claim of Orwell's was that such abuse of language - which in
his novel he labeled "Newspeak"-would ultimately channel thought.
Whatever the merits of this claim as a theory of linguistics, constitutional
developments too recent to be called history demonstrate that as a practical
matter Orwell was on to something. The Court's June 28 decision both
upholding and invalidating the Affordable Care Act ("ACA" or "the Act") is
both a product and an example of constitutional Newspeak. For the last two
years, the question of the constitutionality of the ACA deeply divided public
opinion, the legal profession, the lower federal courts, and ultimately the
Supreme Court of the United States. Throughout all the exhaustive and
exhausting debates, editorials, discussions, arguments, and opinions,
however, one legal proposition commanded complete accord: that
Congress'sCommerce Clause powers were subject to judicially enforceable
limits. It is no small irony, then, that this universally recognized legal
proposition happens to be false. Indeed, it has not been true for almost a
century, is not true today, and will not be true for the indefinite future.
Moreover, the falsity of this proposition cannot be news to anyone.
Time and again, throughout the twentieth century and so far as we have
come in the next, the Court has demonstrated that it is either unwilling or
unable to impose meaningful constraints on Congress's power under the
Commerce Clause. To be sure, the Court has assiduously avoided
acknowledging this reality. It has, instead, reliably carried forward in its
opinions sententious declarations to the contrary - proclamations of its
somber but inalienable duty to prevent Congress from straying past its
bounds. Patently false, these claims nonetheless shaped and ultimately
governed the Commerce Clause controversy generated by the ACA.
At every turn in the ACA litigation, the Act's defenders were hindered
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by their not having the words to make their case forthrightly. This constraint
not only accorded the challenger's constitutional claim more oxygen than it
deserved, but may have also figured in the self-delusion necessary for so
many, on and off the bench, to find the claim so compelling. During the
greater part of the twentieth century, the reality of judicial abdication of any
duty to enforce the enumerated powers scheme was at first merely unspoken,
later became unspeakable, and ultimately came to be virtually unthinkable.
The two-year-long debate over the constitutionality of the ACA was the
culmination of six decades of constitutional Newspeak.
Or so this manuscript argues. It also explores some questions this
account raises for the future health of our constitutional order.
INTRODUCTION

For the last two years, the question of the constitutionality of the Affordable
Care Act ("ACA" or "Act") deeply divided public opinion, the legal profession,
the lower federal courts and, ultimately the Supreme Court of the United States.
Throughout all the exhaustive and exhausting debates, editorials, discussions,
arguments, and, opinions, however, one legal proposition commanded complete
accord: that Congress's Commerce Clause powers were subject to judicially
enforceable limits. It is no small irony, then, that this universally recognized legal
proposition happens to be false. Indeed, it has not been true for almost a century, is
not true today, and will not be true for the indefinite future.
Moreover, the falsity of this proposition cannot be news to anyone. Time and
again, throughout the twentieth century, and so far as we have come in the next, the
Court has demonstrated that it is either unwilling or unable to impose meaningful
constraints on Congress's power under the Commerce Clause. To be sure, the
Court has assiduously avoided acknowledging this reality. It has instead reliably
carried forward in its opinions' sententious declarations to the contrary proclamations of its somber but inalienable duty to prevent Congress from straying
past its bounds. There were in the ACA litigation only the slenderest of hints - and
these merely inferences from shadows, really - that any distance separated what the
Court says from what it does. These hints came in two Court of Appeals opinions
authored by stalwart conservatives who, with candor bordering on impudence,
indicated that they had tired of the Commerce Clause charade. Emperors and new
garments come to mind.
But for the best allegory, look not to Hans Christian Anderson2 but to George
Orwell. In his classic dystopian novel, 1984, he imagines a world in which
language is regularly contorted to mean its opposite - as in the waging of war by
the Ministry of Peace and infliction of torture by the Ministry of Love. 3 Lest this
1. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), amended by
Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010).
2. HANS CHRISTIAN ANDERSEN, The Emperor's New Clothes, in Anderson's FAIRY TALES BY HANS
CHRISTIAN ANDERSEN 66 (World Publ'g Co. 1946).

3. See GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 at 4 (Signet, 1948-1950). To choose but one memorable example, on
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connection be deemed too attenuated, recall that a core claim of Orwell's was that
such abuse of language - labeled "Newspeak"-would ultimately channel thought.4
Whatever the merits of this claim as a theory of linguistics,5 constitutional
developments too recent to be called history demonstrate that as a practical matter
Orwell was on to something. For at every turn in the ACA litigation, the Act's
defenders were hindered by their not having the words to make their case
forthrightly. This constraint not only accorded the challenger's constitutional claim
more oxygen than it deserved, but may have also figured in the self-delusion
necessary for so many, on and off the bench, to find the claim so compelling. For
most of the twentieth century, the reality of judicial abdication of any duty to
enforce the enumerated powers scheme was at first merely unspoken, later became
unspeakable, and ultimately came to be virtually unthinkable. The two-year-long
debate over the constitutionality of the ACA was the culmination of six decades of
constitutional Newspeak.
The ACA's constitutional near miss illustrates the danger of speaking as though
a constitution long dead were still vital. The remedy, of course, is transparency.
Unfortunately, that seems highly unlikely, at least in the foreseeable future. One
question this state of affairs poses, and which this essay ventures to answer, is: why
have the courts and the legal profession been so consistently unwilling to admit that
the only constraints on congressional power are political ones? The stubbornness of
the myth of a judicially enforceable enumerated powers doctrine no doubt has many
causes, but they likely include the institutional advantages achieved by maintaining
a doctrine as Delphic as the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
I. Is There No Limit?
The Supreme Court's June 28 ruling that Congress's Commerce Clause power
could not be used to mandate individual purchase of health insurance6 represented a
revival, however constrained, of long-ago discredited principles of economic
substantive due process in federalism garb.7 Not surprisingly, however, these
principles would remain concealed, lurking below the surface of the opinions

the novel's fourth page, one learns that emblazoned on the "Ministry of Truth" is the following message:
"WAR IS PEACE, FREEDOM IS SLAVERY, IGNORANCE IS STRENGTH." Id.
4. See id. at 298-299. ("The purpose of Newspeak was not only to provide a medium of expression for
the worldview and mental habits proper to the devotees of IngSoc [i.e., English Socialism], but to make all
other modes of thought impossible. It was intended that when Newspeak had been adopted once and for all
and Oldspeak forgotten, a heretical thought-that is a thought diverging from the principles of Ing-should be
literally unthinkable, at least so far as thought is dependent on words.").
5. See Jim Chen, Law as a Species of Language Acquisition, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1263, 1308n.262
(1995) (identifying the "Sapir-Whorf hypothesis" as positing "that the semantic and syntactic features of
human language define the range of behavior and abstract thought" and dismissing the theory as
"discredited").
6. Nat'l Fed of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2585-93 (2012).
7. See infra notes 49, 164 and accompanying text; see also Peter J. Smith, Federalism,Lochner, and the
Individual Mandate, 91 B.U. L. REv. 1723, 1726 (2011) ("[B]ecause the objections to the individual mandate,
though couched in federalism terms, have very little to do with federalism at all, it is difficult to see them as
anything other than Lochner under a different guise").
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explaining that conclusion. Nominally, the conclusion was justified as following
ineluctably from the need to impose some meaningful, judicially enforceable limit
on Congress's Commerce Clause authority. 9 Indeed, the "there must be a limit"
argument echoed throughout the litigation and accounts for the intellectual
respectability that the challenge to the mandate eventually secured.10
For someone unfamiliar with the minutiae of the twentieth-century's tortuous
history of judicial attempts to cabin Congress's power under the Commerce Clause,
this argument has great rhetorical force. Nothing could be more evident, nor has
been so repeatedly and solemnly intoned throughout the U.S. reports, as the
proposition that the text and the original understanding of the Constitution
contemplated that the "enumeration [of congressional powers] presupposes
something not enumerated." 11 But history, both remote and recent, belies that
claim, at least insofar as the judiciary is concerned. For more than a century, the
claim has cycled through periods of neglect, observance, and neglect such that
anyone intimately familiar with this history would be compelled to conclude that
this need for limits has been only most selectively invoked.12 After recounting the
salience of the supposed need-for-a-limit argument in the Affordable Care Act
litigation, this part explores the lengthy record of judicial behavior that exposes that
claim as a canard.
A. The ConstitutionalChallenge to the Affordable Care Act
When the lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of the ACA were filed
within hours of President Obama signing the bill into law, the overwhelming
consensus among legal commentators from across the ideological spectrum was that
the legal claims were borderline frivolous and clearly destined to fail.13 Their filing
was explained away as a mere publicity stunt by partisan political actors.14 To be
sure, this view was not unanimously held. Most prominently, Professor Randy
Barnett steadfastly insisted that Congress lacked power to impose a purchase
mandate. 15 But throughout his long and distinguished career Professor Barnett had
never shied away from a position at or even beyond the boundaries of the legal and
academic mainstream.16 The vast majority of commentators who addressed the
merits of the lawsuits contemporaneous with their filing predicted a very lopsided

8. See infra notes 49, 164 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 47-57 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 25-46 and accompanying text.
11. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)1,195 (1824).
12. See infra notes 62-108 and accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., Mark Arsenault, Making a Case vs. Obama'sHealth CareLaw;
Legal Scholar's Opposition Gets Attention, BOSTON GLOBE, April 2, 2011, at 222A2; James B. Stewart,
Commerce, Health Careand Broccoli, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2012, at B 1.
14. See, e.g., David A. Fahrenthold & N.C. Aizenman, Health Law Fight Shifling to Courts, WASH.
POST, Feb. 3, 2011, at Al (noting that initially lawsuits challenging the ACA were "widely dismissed as a
quixotic political tactic").
15. See Arsenault, supranote 13, at A2.
16. See id.
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Supreme Court victory for the Administration, should the challenges even make it
that far.17
U.S. District Judge Hudson's August 2, 2010 denial of the government's
motion to dismiss in one of these cases pierced that confident consensus with a
sliver of doubt, which in turn grew considerably when four months later he
invalidated the individual insurance mandate.1 9 As Professor Barnett was himself
quick to recognize, this ruling, which after all reflected the view of a single Article
III judge, ought not to have had a significant impact on public discourse. 20
Nevertheless, the decision shifted the legal academy to a grudging concession of the
challenges' intellectual legitimacy. 21
The rallying cry raised by the challengers of the ACA was that there had to be
some limit on federal authority, implying that in the wake of a ruling sustaining the
Act there would be none. In a pedantic sense, this claim was false, as the
government's lawyers repeatedly and patiently explained22 and as the Supreme
Court dissenters on the Commerce Clause question ultimately protested. 23
Nevertheless, this claim had enormous rhetorical force and was centrally
responsible for the unexpected success of the challengers' Commerce Clause
contention. That contention appealed to so many because, notwithstanding its
inconsistency with seventy years of Commerce Clause jurisprudence, it was almost
certainly correct as a matter of constitutional first principles. Even the Act's most
ardent defenders shied away from the notion that the Framers of the Constitution
had envisioned a central government with the power to order virtually every legal
resident to buy a qualifying commercial product. 24
The significance of the need-for-a-limit argument to the challengers' success on
the Commerce Clause question is reflected at every stage of the ACA litigation. In
the decisive sentence in the first judicial opinion to invalidate the mandate, Judge
Hudson observed that the government's "broad definition of the economic activity
subject to congressional regulation lacks logical limitation."25 Six weeks later,
Judge Vinson echoed this observation in his opinion likewise invalidating the
mandate.26 After extensive discussion of nineteenth-century understandings of the
17. See, e.g., Michael Kranish, Health Mandate Tests the Reach of Government;
No DirectLegal Precedentfor Order to Buy Insurance, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 25, 2010, at Al; Stewart, supra
note 13, at BI.
18. Virginia ex rel Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d 598, 615 (E.D. Va. 2010).
19. Virginia ex rel Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F.Supp. 2d 768, 788 (E.D. Va. 2010).
20. See Fahrenthold & Aizenman, supranote 14, at Al.
21. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Just One Ruling, But an Outsize One, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2010, at A24.
22. See infra notes 139-141 and accompanying text.
23. See NF.IB., 132 S. Ct. at 2623-24 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the
judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
24. Cf Dan T. Coenen, Originalism and the "Individual Mandate": Rounding Out the Government's
(2012)
U.
L.
REV.
COLLOQUY
55,
55-56
Case for Constitutionality, 107 Nw.
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2012/10/LRColl2012nl0Coenen.pdf (noting that the
government's argument for the mandate "was overwhelmingly based on modern precedents and pragmatic
considerations," but nevertheless maintaining that the government had "a powerful set of originalist
arguments it could have made to the Court").
25. Cuccinelli, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 781.
26. See Florida v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 780 F.Supp.2d 1256, 1286 (N.D. Fla. 2011).
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Commerce Clause,27 Judge Vinson demurred to the claim that Congress could
"compel an otherwise passive individual into a commercial transaction with a third
party." 28 Were the courts to accede to such a claim, he reasoned, "it is not
hyperbolizing to suggest that Congress could do almost anything it wanted." 29
The constitutional health of the ACA waxed and waned over the ensuing
eighteen months, as it received decidedly mixed reviews in the Courts of Appeals
on its way to the Supreme Court. The fear that to uphold the ACA would confer on
Congress virtually unlimited authority was even more salient in the Federal Courts
of Appeals. It was the lynchpin of the Eleventh Circuit's opinion affirming Judge
Vinson's conclusion that the mandate was unconstitutional. Beginning "with first
principles," Judges Dubina and Hull emphasized that "in determining if a
congressional action is within the limits of the Commerce Clause, we must look not
only to the action itself but also its implications for our constitutional structure." 30
They eschewed reliance on "semantic or formalistic categories" and thus dismissed
as "immaterial whether" the mandate was more properly conceived as "regulating
inactivity or a financial decision to forego insurance." 31 What did matter,
decisively, was that the government's theory of the Commerce Clause "would allow
Congress to regulate anything." 32 Indeed, Judges Dubina and Hull deemed the
government's failure "to articulate cognizable, judicially administrable limiting
principles" as demonstrating that under the government's theory none existed.3 3
The call for limiting principles continued at the Supreme Court level. It
supplied the premise of the challengers' briefs.3 4 And it dominated the oral
argument. Justice Scalia asked whether the government's theory would permit
federal purchase mandates "in any market at all."35 The Chief Justice was
concerned that the government's argument might extend to a mandate to purchase
cell phones.36 Justice Alito worried that federally mandated purchases of burial
insurance would be imminent, were the Act upheld.37 And then twelve minutes
27. See id. at 1274-77. Judge Vinson hastened to add that the history was the alpha but not the omega of
his analysis. Id. at 1277 ("To acknowledge the foregoing historical facts is not necessarily to say that the
power under the Commerce Clause was intended to (and must) remain limited to the trade or exchange of
goods, and be confined to the task of eliminating trade barriers erected by and between the states.").
28. Id. at 1286.
29. Id.
30. Florida v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1284 (11th Cir. 2011) (citation
omitted).
31. Id. at 1287, 1293 (quoting Lopez v. United States, 514 U.S. 549, 569 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (other citations omitted)).
32. Id. (citing United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615 (2000)). See also id. at 1295 ("The
government's position amounts to an argument that the mere fact of an individual's existence substantially
affects interstate commerce, and therefore Congress may regulate them at every point of their life. This theory
affords no limiting principles in which to confine Congress's enumerated power.").
33. Id at 1298. See also Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 570 (6th Cir. 2011) (Graham,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The problem with the government's line of reasoning here is
that it has no logical end point . . . .").
34. See Brief for State Resps. on the Minimum Coverage Provision at 27, N.F.I.B., 132 S. Ct. 2566 (No.
11-398).
35. Transcript of Oral Argument at 5, N.F.I.B., 132 S. Ct. 2566 (No. 11-398).
36. Id. at 6.
37. Id. at 7-9.
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into Solicitor General Verrilli's argument, broccoli reared its ugly head. Given the
inevitability of participation in the food market, Justice Scalia inquired, what would
prevent the government from making everyone buy broccoli? 38
After Justice Breyer suggested that Verrilli's efforts to distinguish cell phones
and burial services from health care were somewhat suspect, 39 Justice Kennedy
generalized the concern raised by all the previous questions: "Can you identify for
us some limits on the Commerce Clause?" 4 0 General Verrilli had barely finished
his attempt 4 1 to answer, when Scalia replied that, under the government's theory,
Congress could mandate the purchase of cars.42 For good measure Scalia added
that the Act could not be sustained under the Necessary and Proper Clause because
to do so would violate an evident principle in the Constitution, which is that the
Federal Government is not supposed to be a government that has all powers: that
it's supposed to be a government of limited powers. 43 Justice Alito brought the
circus full circle by rather imperiously demanding that Verrilli "express [his]
limiting principle as succinctly as . . . possibl[e] . . . Congress can force people to

purchase a product where the failure to purchase the product has a substantial effect
on interstate commerce, if what?"44 The question sounds like a trap because it was,
and the yield was not pretty. 45 The Act's opponents crowed that Verrilli's rambling
response proved the Act to be constitutionally deficient to any mind still open to
.46
reasoned persuasion.
As expected, given the tone of the oral argument, the where's-the-limit
contention figured prominently in the opinions of the five Justices who concluded
that the mandate exceeded the Commerce Clause. The Chief Justice, at the very
outset of his analysis, described the case as one concerning "two powers that the
Constitution does grant the Federal Government, but which must be read carefully
to avoid creating a general federal authority akin to the police power."47 The
distinction between activity and inactivity was crucial precisely because "[a]llowing
Congress to justify federal regulation by pointing to the effect of inaction on

38. Id. at 13. See generally Paul Krugman, Broccoli andBadFaith,N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2012, at A27
(discussing Justice Scalia's question at oral argument).
39. Transcript of Oral Argumen, supranote 35, at 15-16.
40. Id. at 16.
41. That General Verrilli's answer was so uninspiring reveals little about the ACA but much about the
emptiness of the Court's previous paeans to judicially enforceable limits on the commerce power. See infra
notes 62-108 and accompanying text.
42. Transcript of Oral Argument, supranote 35, at 19-20.
43. Id. at 28 ("JUSTICE SCALIA: An equally evident constitutional principle is the principle that the
Federal Government is a government of enumerated powers and that the vast majority of powers remain in the
States and do not belong to the Federal Government. Do you acknowledge that that's a principle?
GENERAL VERRILLI: Of course we do, Your Honor.").
44. Id. at 43.
45. Of course the Court is itself the author of this confusion. For a century the Court itself had
assidulously avoided articulating any limits on Congress's Commerce Clause power while at the same time
insisting on their existence and importance. See infra notes 62-109 and accompanying text.
46. See, e.g., Editorial, Strong Case Against Health Care Reform Law Isn't So Surprising, WATERLOOCEDAR FALLS COURIER, Apr. 1, 2012, at Fl; Michael W. McConnell, The Liberal Legal Meltdown Over
Obamacare, WALL ST. J., May 25, 2012, at Al3.
47. N.F.I.B., 132 S. Ct. at 2578.
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commerce would bring countless decisions an individual could potentially make
within the scope of federal regulation."48 Although autonomy justifications echoed
throughout the Chief Justice's opinion,4 9 the mandate's only identified
constitutional infirmity was that, were it upheld, there would remain no judicially
enforceable limits on Congress's power under the Commerce Clause.5 0 The Act
would be a precedent "permitting Congress to reach beyond the natural extent of its
authority, 'everywhere extending the sphere of its activity and drawing all power
into its impetuous vortex."' 5 1
The purported need for a judicially enforceable limit on the Commerce Clause
played an even greater role in the joint dissent of Justices Kennedy, Scalia, Thomas,
and Alito. Indeed, it did all the work. While "in one respect" the case presented
novel and challenging constitutional issues, it was from a broader perspective "easy
and straightforward."52 The apparent difficulty melted away because it was
absolutely clear, affirmed by the text of the 1789 Constitution, by
the Tenth Amendment ratified in 1791, and by innumerable cases
of ours in the 220 years since, ... that there are structural limits
upon federal power-upon what it can prescribe with respect to
private conduct .... Whatever may be the conceptual limits upon
the Commerce Clause and upon the power to tax and spend, they
cannot be such as will enable the Federal Government to regulate
all private conduct .... 53
This "clear principle" supplied both the alpha and the omega for the dissent's
analysis. 54 Were the Act upheld, the Commerce Clause would "become a font of
unlimited power."55 This conclusion followed deductively because, as the dissent
explained, "[i]f all inactivity affecting commerce is commerce, [then] commerce is
everything."56 Having joined that iron-clad inference with the "fundamental
precept" that "the Federal Government cannot do everything," the joint dissent
declared victory.5 7
48. Id. at 2587.
49. Id. (stressing that the government's theory would "empower Congress to make those decisions," i.e.,
what to do or to buy, for the individual); see also id at 2588 ("The Government's theory here would
effectively [][]. . .[] establish[] that individuals may be regulated under the Commerce Clause whenever
enough of them are not doing something the Government would have them do.").
50. Id. at 2589. (According to the Chief Justice, the Court's cases have "always recognized that the
power to regulate commerce, though broad indeed, has limits"). Id. (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
51. Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 309 (J. Madison)).
52. Id. at 2642-43 (joint dissenting opinion).
53. Id. at 2643.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 2646
56. Id. at 2649.
57. Id. at 2647. (Anticipating the theme of this essay, Justice Thomas, in his short, separate dissent,
observed that the Court had only itself to blame, as the Court's laxity in enforcing principled limits had
"encouraged the Federal Government to persist in its view that the Commerce Clause has virtually no limits").
Id. at 2677 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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In short, the need-for-a-limit argument, when joined with the assertion that to
allow congressional regulation of inactivity would permit no meaningful limit on
the commerce power, was the syllogism that harassed the individual mandate
throughout the litigation and provided the indispensable underpinning of the
argument that ultimately convinced five justices that the mandate exceeded that
power. And were the Court writing on a blank slate, the syllogism might well have
been unanswerable. In the light cast by the troubled history of the Court's efforts
to enforce the enumerated powers doctrine, however, it becomes clear that the
syllogism rested upon perhaps the most stubborn and virulent example of
constitutional Newspeak.
B. The Wages of Commerce Clause History
"2 + 2 = 5"59

Early in the new century, the Supreme Court narrowly upheld the use of the
Commerce Clause to exterminate commerce as a means of regulating it. Congress
had done so for the rather transparent reason that the subject of trade was thought to
be destructive to the citizenry's moral welfare. In dissent an indisputably buttoneddown Justice, who none doubted abhored the noxious article, railed against the
majority in almost apocalyptic terms, warning that the case made a mockery of the
Constitution's enumerated power scheme.
Of course, all this might be said of the Supreme Court's 2005 ruling in
Gonzales v. Raich,60 which will be examined in due course.61 But it also describes
the Court's ruling a century earlier in Champion v. Ames (The Lottery Case).62 The
threat to the moral order then was the "pestilence of lotteries" not the scourge of
medical marijuana, and the dissenter was Chief Justice Melvin Fuller, not Justice
Clarence Thomas. But the parallel between the cases demonstrates how little
progress had been made in the intervening century.
Writing for himself and three other Justices, Chief Justice Fuller depicted the
case as the beginning of the end of American federalism.63 What Fuller found so
alarming about the federal prohibition on interstate shipment of lottery tickets was
that in enacting the ban, Congress had for perhaps the first time exercised its power
over interstate commerce to deter private conduct it deemed a menace to public

58. Cf Gary Lawson & David B. Kopel, The PPACA in Wonderland, 38 AM. J.L. & MED. 269, 270
(2012) (concluding that the mandate exceeded congressional power "[a]ccording to the original meaning of
the Constitution" but "express[ing] no view on whether the Supreme Court will find the act unconstitutional,
for the Supreme Court often deviates from original meaning"). But see Coenen, supra note 24, at 56. (arguing
that "a proper originalist understanding of the constitutional text" supports upholding the minimum coverage
provision).
59. ORWELL, supra note 3, at 290.
60. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
61. See infra notes 106-108 and accompanying text.
62. 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
63. See id. at 375 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
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morality.64 This novel use of the commerce power threatened to displace state
regulatory authority in ways that no prior statutes had.65 Fuller explained that
"[t]he power of the State to impose restraints and burdens on persons and property
in conservation and promotion of the public health, good order and prosperity" was
"a power originally and always belonging to the States, not surrendered by them to
the General Government nor directly restrained by the Constitution of the United
States, and essentially exclusive . . . ."66 Fuller concluded that to permit Congress
to convert, in effect, its power over the channels of interstate commerce into a
"general police power would be to hold that it may accomplish objects not entrusted
to the General Government, and to defeat the operation of the Tenth
Amendment." 67 Acquiescing in the federal prohibition was "a long step in the
direction of wiping out all traces of state lines, and the creation of a centralized
Government."68 Concluding, Fuller lamented that "[o]ur form of government may
remain notwithstanding legislation or decision, but, as long ago observed, it is with
governments, as with religions, the form may survive the substance of the faith." 69
Fuller's apoplexy might be amusing were his opinion not so prophetic. In fact
The Lottery Case was merely the first of dozens of times that the need-for-a-limit
argument would be neither answered nor even rebuffed so much as ignored by a
Supreme Court majority opinion approving some challenged exercise of federal
power. An exhaustive treatment of this history is here as unnecessary as it would
be unwelcome. Not only has the familiar story been fully developed elsewhere, 70
but for present purposes even a cursory recounting amply makes the pertinent
point-namely, that the Supreme Court abdicated any responsibility to enforce the
enumerated powers scheme decades before Barack Obama was born.
In the first third of the twentieth century the Court repeatedly condoned
congressional use of its authority over interstate commerce to achieve an ever
expanding array of police-power objectives. Congress's enumerated powers were
deemed sufficiently expansive to protect the nation from the dangers of tainted
food, narcotics,72 prostitution, adultery,74 auto theft, intoxicating spirits,76 and,
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

See id. at 364-65.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 365.
Id. at 371 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 375 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).

70. See, e.g., DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: 1888-1986, at 93-98,&
173-180 (1990).
71. See Hipolite Egg Co.v. United States, 220 U.S. 45 (1911).
72. See United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86 (1919); Nigro v. United States, 276 U.S. 332 (1928). See
generally A. Christopher Bryant, Nigro v. United States: The Most Disingenuous Supreme Court Opinion,
Ever, 12 NEv. L.J. 650 (2012).
73. See Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, (1913).
74. See Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917).
75. See Brooks v. United States, 267 U.S. 432 (1925).
76. See James Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Md. Ry. Co., 242 U.S. 311 (1917). (In Clark Distilling,
the Court rejected a constitutional challenge to the Webb-Kenyon Act, which prohibited shipment of
intoxicating liquors into a state only if the shipment violated state law. Id. at 312. A few weeks after the
decision in Clark Distilling, Congress enacted the Reed Amendment, which further extended the federal
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perhaps most dreadful of all, oleomargarine.
Sometimes these rulings provoked
dissents like Fuller's-denouncing such broad interpretations of congressional
authority as fundamentally inconsistent with a structure according the central
government only limited authority.78 At other times, no one on the High Court
even questioned the encroachment on the reserved powers of the states. 79 Be that
as it may, the tide of federal power flowed unchecked. To be sure, in rare bolts out
of the blue, the Court invalidated an occasional ill-fated federal statute. It was as
if on these occasions the Court suddenly awoke to its constitutional responsibilities,
though these bouts of conscientiousness invariably proved short in duration ' and in
any event were never suffered to interfere with congressional efforts to preserve
Edwardian morality. 82
So matters stood when the clash between President Roosevelt and the Court
forced the latter into unambiguous retreat.83 Unconditional surrender came in the
form of the Court's unanimous decision in Wickard v. Filburn.84 The case has
come to stand principally for the so-called "aggregation principle.,,s According to
this doctrine, rather than consider an individual's contribution in isolation, courts
are to aggregate all similarly situated individuals when assessing whether they have
a sufficiently "substantial effect" on interstate commerce to trigger congressional
power.86 For present purposes, the most telling aspect of this 1942 ruling was that
Justice Jackson's opinion for the Court did not even pretend to preserve any
judicially enforceable limit on Congress's Commerce Clause authority. 8 This
deficiency was neither inadvertent nor unremarked. In a wonderfully telling
exchange of letters between then-Judge Sherman Minton and Justice Jackson, the
prohibition on interstate transport of alcohol.) See also United States v. Hill, 248 U.S. 420 (1919) (upholding
federal criminal prosecution of one who carried a single quart of liquor from Kentucky into West Virginia for
personal use, even though West Virginia law permitted the conduct); id. at 428 (McReynolds, J., dissenting)
("[T]he Reed Amendment in no proper sense regulates interstate commerce, but is a direct intermeddling with
the State's internal affairs.").
77. See McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27 (1904). (The tax was relatively transparent protectionism
shielding the buttery industry from competition, justified by undocumented claims that artificially colored
oleomargarine somehow endangered public health, or at the least engendered consumer confusion. Id.) For an
insightful and deliciously ironic history of "the first battle in the margarine war," which culminated in the
passage of 1886 Act ultimately challenged in McCray. See Geoffrey Miller, Public Choice at the Dawn of the
Special Interest State: The Story of Butter and Margarine,77 CALIF. L. REv. 83, 83 (1989).
78. See Champion, 188 U.S at 371 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
79. See, e.g., Brooks, 267 U.S. at 432.
80. See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 268 (1918).
81. See Bryant, supranote 72, at 652-55.
82. See generally A. Christopher Bryant, The Third Death of Federalism, 17 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 101, 116-29 (2007).
83. See THOMAS B. McAFFEE ET AL., POWERS RESERVED FOR THE PEOPLE AND THE STATES: A
HISTORY OF THE NINTH AND TENTH AMENDMENTS 143-61 (2006).

84. 317 U.S. 11l 128-29 (1942).
85. See Jim Chen, Filbum's Legacy, 52 EMORY L.J. 1719, 1748 (2003) (noting that "Filburn has added
the 'aggregation' maneuver to constitutional law's argumentative arsenal" and that "[t]hanks to Filburn,
Congress may reach any economic actor trivial by itself as long as its contribution to the national economy,
taken together with that of many other actors similarly situated, is far from trivial") (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted).
86. See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 127-28.
87. See id. at 128-29.
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latter pled guilty to the former's charge that his Wickard opinion had loosed the
judicial reins on Congress's Commerce Clause power. In a December 17, 1942
letter to Jackson, Minton wrote that he had "just finished reading your very
interesting opinion in Wickard."89 With a disarming insouciance, Minton urged
"[1]et's be brutally frank." 90 If the Justices wished "to adopt an unlimited concept
as to interstate commerce, why not say so [and] throw in the ash can those cases
that disagree[?]"91 Four days later, Jackson replied, conceding that
If we were to be brutally frank, as you suggest, I suspect what we
would say is that in any case where Congress thinks there is an
effect on interstate commerce, the Court will accept that judgment.
All of the efforts to set up formulae to confine the commerce
power have failed. When we admit that it is an economic matter,
we pretty nearly admit that it is not a matter which courts may

judge.92
The significance of this exchange is not that the interpretation of Supreme Court
decisions should be governed by a quixotic search for authorial intent. Rather, the
point is that the Court's opinion in Wickard meant what it said and that Jackson's
failure therein to identify judicially enforceable limits on the commerce power was
a self-conscious one. By 1942, any such limits had vanished.
As significantly, the Minton-Jackson correspondence documents the fact that
the secret was an open one, apparent to any sophisticated reader.93 Even so, no
matter how widely and accurately perceived, this truth remained shrouded and at
odds with the formal judicial narrative, which insisted on the existence of judicially
enforceable limits on congressional authority, no matter how remote and fanciful.
So began the era of Commerce Clause Newspeak, in which lawyers and judges
were obligated to say one thing all the while knowing its opposite to be true.
Predictably, the Court's inability or refusal to make explicit its implicit
abdication of the duty to cabin Congress's Commerce Clause power ensured that

88. See Letter from Sherman Minton, Judge, to Justice Robert H. Jackson, Justice, United State Supreme
Court (Dec. 17, 1942) (on file with Robert H. Jackson Papers, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division)
(copy on file with author). I thank John Q. Barrett for bringing this exchange of letters to light on the eve of
the Court's ruling in N.F.I.B. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id (In a self-disparaging flourish of deference, Minton hastened to add: "I suppose I am wrong and
you are right-I never did have any finesse.") Id. Still, he stopped short of withdrawing his question. Id.
92. Letter from Robert H. Jackson, Justice, United State Supreme Court, to Sherman Minton, Judge
(Dec. 21, 1942) (unsigned carbon copy of typed letter) ),(on file with ),Robert H. Jackson Papers, Library of
Congress, Manuscript Division,),... Jackson added that, as he read them, prior decisions had signaled a sort of
"strategic retreat by the courts from the effort to control the action of Congress in the field of interstate
commerce." Id.
93. Nor was Minton-Jackson correspondence an isolated instance. To the contrary, Jackson seems to
have felt a compulsion to confess that he had in Wickard written the epitaph to judicial enforcement of the
enumerated powers scheme. See generally Barry Cushman, Continuity and Change in Commerce Clause
Jurisprudence,55 ARK. L. REV. 1009, 1053 (2003) (discussing Jackson's memorandum to his law clerk).
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the need-for-a-limit argument would still occasionally be asserted in litigation.94
For six decades, the Court invariably rejected the claim.9 5 As the late Philip
Frickey observed, "by the 1980s the Commerce Clause game seemed about over.
Casebook editors were driven to dream up wild hypotheticals to try to find ways to
encourage students to consider whether the commerce power had any practical
,,96
limits at all".
Yet all the while, in the U.S. reports the legal fiction endured. 97
Then in 1995 the Supreme Court shocked the legal community by striking
down the Gun-Free School Zones Act on the ground that it was beyond the reach of
Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce.98 Writing for a bare five-Justice
majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist sought to demonstrate the invalidity of the 1990
statute without overruling any of the Court's Commerce Clause precedents. 99 To
the four dissenters, his careful parsing of the precedents missed the forest for the
trees. The core teaching of the Court's relevant post-New Deal jurisprudence was
that the Court would not second-guess Congress's conclusion that a matter fell
within its Commerce Clause authority. oo In any event, Lopez had little impact on
the work of the lower federal courts. Between 1995 and 1999, the federal
intermediate appellate courts rejected every Commerce Clause challenge to a
federal statute. 10 1 It was as though the U.S. Courts of Appeals uniformly
94. See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971) (rejecting Commerce Clause challenge to a
criminal conviction under a federal statute governing intrastate extortionate credit transactions).
95. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, "A Government of Limited and EnumeratedPowers": In Defense of
United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752, 752 (1995) (describing the Court as "being 'asleep at the
constitutional switch' for more than fifty years" that elapsed between the decisions upholding New Deal
legislation and 1995); Lino A. Graglia, United States v. Lopez: Judicial Review Under the Commerce Clause
74 TEx. L. REV. 719, 746 (1996) (concluding that since the New Deal, "the Court ha[dsd] engaged in only
pretend review" under the Commerce Clause).
96. Philip P. Frickey, The Fool on the Hill: CongressionalFindings, ConstitutionalAdjudication, and
United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 695, 701 & n.39 (1996). Professor Frickey's examples
included the following: (1) DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:

THEMES FOR THE CONSTITUTION'S THIRD CENTURY 789, 813, 817 (1993) (questioning whether congressional
power could reach a child's front-yard lemonade stand); (2) GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 140
(12th ed. 1991) (contemplating federal prohibition on possession of all pills because it is difficult to
distinguish dangerous pills from others); (3) GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 197, 209 (2d
ed. 1991) (suggesting federal prohibition of shoplifting and federal regulation of the lawn, parking lot, and
disposal of trash at carry-out restaurant).
97. See Perez, 402 U.S. at 156-57.
98. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995).
99. Id. at 559-61.
100. See, e.g., id. at 604 (Souter, J., dissenting) (asserting that "[t]he practice of deferring to rationally
based legislative judgments is a paradigm of judicial restraint" which is especially appropriate insofar as
congressional regulation under the Commerce Clause is concerned because "[i]n judicial review under the
Commerce Clause, [this judicial deference] reflects our respect for the institutional competence of the
Congress on a subject expressly assigned to it by the Constitution and our appreciation of the legitimacy that
comes from Congress's political accountability in dealing with matters open to a wide range of possible
choices") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); id). Id. at 616-17 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("Courts
must give Congress a degree of leeway in determining the existence of a significant factual connection
between the regulated activity and interstate commerce - both because the Constitution delegates the
commerce power directly to Congress and because the determination requires an empirical judgment of a kind
that a legislature is more likely than a court to make with accuracy.").
101. See Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning, Lower Court Readings of Lopez, or What If the
Supreme Court Held a Constitutional Revolution and Nobody Came?, 2000 Wis. L. REv. 369, 385 n.85
(2000) (noting that the Fourth Circuit's 1999 decision invalidating the civil-remedy provision of the Violence
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interpreted Lopez as an aberration, properly limited to its particular facts.102 The
Supreme Court in turn side-stepped every call to clarify Lopez's precedential
significance, consistently denying petitions for certiorari in numerous post-Lopez
103
Commerce Clause cases.
Then in 2000 lighting struck again. The same five Justices who comprised the
Lopez majority joined forces to invalidate the civil-remedy provision of the
Violence Against Women Act.104 The Chief Justice's majority opinion stressed the
Court's reluctance to aggregate the effects of individual instances of intrastate, noneconomic activity for the purposes of deciding whether the activity had the requisite
substantial effect on interstate commerce. He wrote: "While we need not adopt a
categorical rule against aggregating the effects of any noneconomic activity in order
to decide these cases, thus far in our Nation's history our cases have upheld
Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate activity only where that activity is
economic in nature." 105 However hesitant and qualified, this statement held out the
promise that henceforth a legal rule would guide the Court's efforts to cabin
Congress's Commerce Clause power. The key inquiry would be whether the object
Reality was
of congressional regulation was truly "economic in nature."
conforming to Newspeak.
Or so it briefly seemed. Elaboration of a distinction between the economic and
non-economic aspects of the world would have been difficult in the best of
circumstances. In fact, the effort collapsed almost as soon as it began. The next
Commerce Clause case to come to the Supreme Court split the socially conservative
and libertarian constituencies of the American political right. It had the same effect
on the Rehnquist Court federalism five. When confronted with the evils of medical
marijuana, the nominally pro-federalism Rehnquist Court, in one of its very last
constitutional decisions, endorsed a reading of congressional power so broad as to
be virtually unlimited. In his opinion for the Court in Gonzales v. Raich, Justice
Stevens found that Angel Raich's possession of any amount of marijuana, even if
for medicinal purposes at the direction of her treating physician and in conformity
with state law, was on the economic side of the line and therefore within the power
of Congress to punish via criminal penalty.106 This was so notwithstanding the
parties' stipulation that the cannabis Raich possessed had never been bought or sold
and had been "grown using only soil, water, nutrients, equipment, supplies, and
lumber originating from or manufactured within California."10 7 As Justice Thomas
lamented in dissent:

Against Women Act was the first U.S. Court of Appeals ruling "to hold a federal statute unconstitutional
based on a Lopez challenge").
102. See id.
103. See, e.g., id. at 396 (noting that prior its 2000 ruling on the Violence Against Women Act the
Supreme Court had consistently "denied certiorari in cases that would have clarified the scope of Lopez").
104. 42 U.S.C. § 1398 1(c) (1999). The section authorized a victim of gender-motivated violence to bring
a tort suit against an assailant in federal district court. Id.
105. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000).
106. See generally Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
107. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 575; Resp'ts Br. at 5, Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (No. 03-1454).
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If the majority is to be taken seriously, the Federal Government
may now regulate quilting bees, clothes drives, and potluck
suppers throughout the 50 States. This makes a mockery of
Madison's assurance to the people of New York that the "powers
delegated" to the Federal Government are "few and defined,"
while those of the States are "numerous and indefinite." . . . One

searches the Court's opinion in vain for any hint of what aspect of
American life is reserved to the States. 0 8
Raich was read widely as marking the end of the ill-fated sojourn launched by
Lopez.109 And just like that, the Court was back in the Newspeak business. 110
C. Defending the Individual Mandate

So matters stood when the ACA was signed into law in March 2010. In
defending the Act, the government suggested two possible limits to its theory of the
Commerce Clause. The first resonated widely as a practical matter, but translated
awkwardly at best into a formal legal limit. The second was formally sound but
substantively vacuous.
1. Health care is unique

The first limit proffered by the government insisted that the power to mandate
individual purchases of privately sold goods extended only to health care insurance
(or at most to a narrow class of highly analogous products). According to this
argument health care insurance was virtually unique. Few if any other products
secured a means to pay for an individual's almost certain future consumption of a
good (i.e., health care) that would at some unpredictable time become both essential
and so enormously expensive as to bankrupt all but the very wealthiest among

108. Raich, 545 U.S. at 69, 70 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 313 (James
Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961)).
109. See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Is Morrison Dead?: Assessing a Supreme (Drug) Law Overdose, 9
LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 751, 765, 777 (2005) (concluding that Raich repudiated Lopez and Morrison);
Thomas W. Merrill, Rescuing Federalism After Raich: The Case for Clear Statement Rules, 9 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 823, 844 (2005) ("Lopez and Morrison have been largely confined to their facts."); John T.
Parry, "Society Must be [Regulated]":Biopolitics and the Commerce Clause in Gonzales v. Raich, 9 LEWIS
& CLARK L. REv. 853, 859 (2005) (Raich teaches "that Wickard is the heart of Commerce Clause doctrine,
while Lopez and Morrison are, if not outliers, at least cases that merely police the outer boundaries of the
doctrine to ensure that Congress is regulating economic activity in the broad sense defined by Raich."); Glenn
H. Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning, What Hath Raich Wrought? Five Takes, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 915,
932 (2005) (expressing doubt that "a robust judicially-enforceable federalism has much future left" after
Raich); Ilya Somin, A False Dawn For Federalism: Clear Statement Rules After Gonzales v. Raich, 2006
CATO SUP. CT. REv. 113, 118 (asserting that Raich "virtually eviscerated" Lopez and Morrison).
110. Cf Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Partial-BirthAbortion and the Perils of Constitutional Common Law, 31
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 519, 579 (2008) (noting that "the Court ... [has] declared that Congress cannot
interfere with areas of 'traditional state concern,' such as crime and education, but . . . [has] allowed Congress
to pass over 3,000 criminal laws and establish a Department of Education.").
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us. I 1 What's more, both federal law and widely shared societal norms required
that the good be supplied without regard to the individual's ability to pay when the
crisis came, resulting in substantial shifting of costs from those without coverage to
those already in the health insurance market.112 These features of the health
insurance, it was said, sufficiently differentiated it from automobiles and broccoli to
cabin the asserted power to compel private purchases to the former and exempt the
latter from congressional command and control.' 13 This answer had the virtue of
tracking underlying economic realities and political sensibilities. Thus, it
convinced those willing to be persuaded, both on 114 and of15 the bench.
To others, however, the answer lay beyond the realm of legality, providing no
articulable principle of constitutional law that would withstand further pressure to
expand federal power. When Justice Alito pressed the Solicitor General to "express
your limiting principle as succinctly as you possibly can,"11 6 even those ardently
seeking the ACA's demise must have cringed when Verrilli answered:
We got two and they are-they are different. Let me state them.
First with respect to the comprehensive scheme. When Congress is
regulating-is enacting a comprehensive scheme that it has the
authority to enact that the Necessary and Proper Clause gives it the
authority to include regulation, including a regulation of this kind,
if it is necessary to counteract risks attributable to the scheme itself
that people engage in economic activity that would undercut the
scheme. It's like-it's very much like Wickard in that respect,
very much like Raich in that respect.
With respect to the-with respect to the-considering the
Commerce Clause alone and not embedded in the comprehensive
scheme, our position is that Congress can regulate the method of
payment by imposing an insurance requirement in advance of the
time in which the-the service is consumed when the class to
which that requirement applies either is or virtually is most certain
to be in that market when the timing of one's entry into that
market and what you will need when you enter that market is
uncertain and when-when you will get the care in that market,
whether you can afford to pay for it or not and shift costs to other
111. See Reply Br. for Pet. at 6, N.F.I.B. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-398) (distinguishing
the individual mandate from other hypothetical mandates for broccoli or cars or gym memberships or other
forms of insurance).
112. See id. at 2-3 ("The minimum coverage provision addresses economic effects that already exist in
the health-care market because the uninsured as a class routinely consume health care they cannot afford.").
113. See id. at l9.
114. See, e.g., N.F.LB., 132 S. Ct. at 2619-20 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see
also Thomas More Law Center v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 565 (6th Cir. 2011) (Sutton, J., concurring in part)
("Regulating how citizens pay for what they already receive (health care), never quite know when they will
need, and in the case of severe illnesses or emergencies generally will not be able to afford, has few (if any)
parallels in modem life.").
115. See, e.g., Krugman, supranote 38, at A27.
116. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 35, at 43.
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market participants.
So those-those are our views as to-those are the principles
we are advocating for and it's, in fact, the conjunction of the two
of them here that makes this, we think, a strong case under the
Commerce Clause.1 17
Though General Verrilli's answer was much maligned in the press,1 its
deficiencies had far less to do with his oratorical skills than with difficulties
identified by the Chief Justice earlier in the argument. As he had observed, the
differences between health insurance and other products were issues of economics,
not law. To police the line between health insurance and broccoli would require
courts to re-examine congressional predictions about the economic effect of a
purchase requirement, or lack thereof.119 More precisely, the health-insurance-isdifferent argument assumed that the courts would henceforth differentiate between
some permissible economic purposes (such as curing the perverse incentives
created by other permissible congressional regulations) and other impermissible
ones (such as stimulating demand for a product or otherwise sustaining its price).
But if purchase mandates were among the lawful tools in Congress's
Commerce Clause toolbox, what constitutional principle would be offended by
future congressional use of these tools to stimulate demand or sustain price objectives that the Court had long ago squarely held to be legitimate ends for the
exercise of the commerce power?1 20 Put differently, no judicially administrable
standard existed to guide judicial reconsideration of the appropriateness of any
particular purchase mandate once Congress had found it suitable.121 As in the
Lochner era,122 the economic theories of legislators, including their ordering of
preferences, would be measured against the economic theories and value judgments
of judges.123 The Chief Justice was right to be reluctant to engage the federal
judiciary in that kind of inquiry, for which it lacks both political legitimacy and
institutional competence.124 Perhaps for these kinds of reasons, some of the Act's
more candid out-of-court defenders conceded that the power to compel purchases

117. Id at43-44.
118. See, e.g., WATERLOO-CEDAR FALLS COURIER, supra note 46; see also David Savage, Trial By Fire
for SolicitorGeneral, L.A. TIMES, May 5, 2012, at 8.
119. Transcript of Oral Argument, supranote 35, at 38-40.
120. See, e.g., Wickard, 317 U.S. 11l, 128 ("It is well established by decisions of this Court that the
power to regulate commerce includes the power to regulate the prices at which commodities in that commerce
are dealt in and practices affecting such prices... . The stimulation of commerce is a use of the regulatory
function quite as definitely as prohibitions or restrictions thereon.").
121. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 35, at 38-39 (Roberts, C.J.) ("[I]t would be going back
to Lochner if we were put in the position of saying no, you can use your commerce power to regulate
insurance, but you can't use your commerce power to regulate this market in other ways. I think that would be
a very significant intrusion by the Court into Congress's power.").
122. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); see generally Smith, supranote 7, at 1725.
123. Transcript of Oral Argument, supranote 35, at 38-39.
124. Id.; cf id. at 77-78 (Paul Clement) ("I think that was the Chief Justice's point which was once you
open the door to compelling people into commerce based on the narrow rationales that exist in this industry,
you are not going to be able to stop that process.").
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extended to just about anything. 125
The incongruity between the health-insurance-is-different argument and the
Court's case law was likewise exhibited in the D.C. Circuit's opinion upholding the
mandate. Writing for the court, Judge Silberman, a senior judge with impeccable
conservative credentials,126 noted that "at oral argument, the Government could not
identify any mandate to purchase a product or service in interstate commerce that
would be unconstitutional, at least under the Commerce Clause." 127 Judge
Silberman further confessed that the court had been no more successful than the
government's lawyers in identifying doctrinal limiting principles.128 Their absence
was admittedly a source of "some discomfort,"1 29 but not sufficiently so to
invalidate the act. In numerous passages of his opinion, Judge Silberman in effect
called the Justices' bluff on their repeated claims that congressional power
remained subject to limits. "The Framers, in using the term 'commerce among the
states,' obviously intended to make a distinction between interstate and local
commerce," Silberman observed.1 30 But "Supreme Court jurisprudence over the
last century has largely eroded that distinction."l 3 1
Citing Scalia's concurring opinion in Raich, Judge Silberman noted that "[a]
single individual need not even be engaged in any economic activity-i.e. not
participating in any local or interstate market-so long as the individual is engaged
in some type of behavior that would undercut a broader economic regulation if left
unregulated."l32 Silberman acknowledged that "a direct requirement for most
Americans to purchase any product or service seems an intrusive exercise of
legislative power" and "certainly is an encroachment on individual liberty."1 33 But
it was "no more so than a command that ... gravely ill individuals cannot use a
substance their doctors described as the only effective palliative for excruciating
pain."l34 Reading between the lines of Silberman's opinion, one message stands
out in relief: Raich had presented the Supreme Court with a federalism litmus test
and Justices Scalia and Kennedy had failed miserably. These two, therefore, had
only themselves to blame for the lack of legal limits on congressional authority, and
125. See, e.g., The Constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act: Hearing Before S. Com. On Judiciary,
I12th Cong. 4 (2011) (statement of Charles Fried, Beneficial Professor of Law, Harvard Law School) ("As for

veggies, I suppose forced feeding would indeed be an invasion of personal liberty, but making you pay for
them would not, just as making you pay for a gym membership you can afford but do not use would not.");
see also James B. Stewart, How Broccoli Landed on the Supreme Court Menu, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2012, at
Al (discussing statements of Dean Erwin Chemerinsky to the effect that Congress could mandate the
purchase of broccoli or automobiles).
126. See David G. Savage, GOP Lawyers See Tilt to Activist High Court, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2012, at Al
(describing Judge Silberman as "a leader of the conservative legal movement").
127. Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 14-15 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
128. See id at 18 ("We acknowledge some discomfort with the Government's failure to advance any
clear doctrinal principles limiting congressional mandates that any American purchase any product or service
in interstate commerce. But to tell the truth, those limits are not apparent to us ....
129. Id
130. Id. at 16.
131. Id
132. Id. at 20 (citing Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 36 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
133. Id.
134. Id
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Silberman refused to warp the law to save them from the consequences of their own
perfidy. 135
2. Health care is economic

The circumstances specific to health care insurance that made the case for an
individual mandate so politically and economically compelling mapped onto
Commerce Clause doctrine awkwardly, at best. But that same doctrine itself
purported to supply limitations that as a theoretical matter should have alleviated
fears that the ACA marked the end of the enumerated powers doctrine. As noted
above, Lopez and Morrison suggested that congressional authority under the
Commerce Clause ran out as regulation reached beyond things in themselves
economic in nature. 136
Not surprisingly, then, in defending the ACA the government chanted back to
the judiciary this supposed limitation. Ideally, this response should have disposed
of the case, as it reflected the only limit even suggested by the Court in the prior
seventy-five years of Commerce Clause jurisprudence and the ACA was
indisputably an economic regulation. Even assuming that the theory of the ACA
reached so far as to permit the imposition of virtually any purchase mandate,
purchases are by their very nature economic transactions. Whatever lay outside the
set of all things economic, the only realm even impliedly held to exceed
congressional authority, would remain immune from federal authority no matter
how the challenges to the ACA were resolved.
So what explains the fact that the numerous august judges and justices, some of
whom gave us the economic/non-economic distinction, found it so unsatisfactory in
this case? Their reaction reveals what should have been apparent for years: namely,
that the realm of non-economic activity is a chimera. The powers reserved by the
Tenth Amendment and denied Congress may only be used to govern a fantasyland.
After the Supreme Court's ruling in Gonzales v. Raich,137 it is hard to imagine
anything that is not economic for the purposes of assessing Congress's Commerce
Clause authority. As the dissenters there pointed out, if Angel Raich's possession
of a small amount of marijuana was economic in nature because it could be sold in
an illegal market, then so too was Lopez's possession of a gun - an industrial
article the subject of a billion-dollar trade, both legal and illicit.138 Of course, once
Lopez is sterilized as a precedent, not much remains of the Rehnquist Court's
celebrated federalism revolution, which in turn explains why the government's
invocation of the economic/non-economic distinction fell on so many deaf ears.
Judges heard and understood the Supreme Court's numerous declarations of the
135. Cf Thomas More Law Center v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 555 (6th Cir. 2011) (Sutton, J., concurring in
part) ("[T]he Court either should stop saying that a meaningful limit on Congress's commerce powers exists
or prove that it is so.").
136. See supra notes 98-106 and accompanying text.
137. 545 U.S. 1 (2005); see supra notes 107-110 and accompanying text.
138. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 50 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("To draw the line wherever
private activity affects the demand for market goods is to draw no line at all, and to declare everything
economic.").
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need for continued judicial enforcement of the enumerated powers doctrine against
the background fact that the non-economic realm had disappeared. All references
to that realm were so much constitutional Newspeak.
This point was illustrated nowhere so starkly as in an exchange between thenActing Solicitor General Katyal and Senior District Judge Graham, who was sitting
by designation on the Sixth Circuit panel considering the constitutionality of the
ACA. Their colloquy illustrates how seven decades of constitutional Newspeak
inhibited clarity in both communication and cognition.
JUDGE GRAHAM: I hear your arguments about the power of
Congress under the Commerce Clause and I am having difficulty
seeing how there is any limit to the power as you're defining it.
And I am starting with the premise thatjust about everything that
human beings do, about every humanfunction I can think of has
139
some economic consequences.

Judge Graham then described the aggregation principle of Wickard and explained
how under it any individual's activity could be deemed a part of a whole that, when
considered in the aggregate, has a substantial effect on interstate commerce.140 He
continued:
JUDGE GRAHAM: So you are always going to be able to satisfy
this substantial effects standard. . . . . Where ultimately is the
limitation on Congress's power and how can the courts begin to
restrain Congress when it begins to do something that may be
invasive on an individual standpoint, such as to require someone to
purchase a product or service that they don't want?
KATYAL: OK. So, Judge Graham, let me be very clear about
this. I agree with every word you just said. So that means that we
are not here saying that there are unlimited powers under
Commerce.
We think that Lopez and Morrison establish
prohibitions that restrict, that forbid the type of adding up of ...
GRAHAM (interrupting): What are they? What are they? Where
are they? I want to find them. That's what I'm struggling with.
KATYAL: Right. So what Lopez and Morrison say is: you've got
to be quintessentially ... you've got to be economic in nature.
And that it can't be the aggregation of a whole bunch of
uneconomic activity. Zero plus zero plus zero is always going to
equal zero.
139. Oral Argument at 43:43, Thomas More Law Center, 651 F.3d 529 (No. 10-2388) (emphasis added).
140. See id.
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Here's what we're saying. We're saying in this market, what
Congress is regulating is not the failure to buy something but the
failure to secure [] financing for something that everyone is going
to buy. So it is just about cash or credit or something like
that .... Congress is reacting to the lion's share of people who
buy health care and consume health care but without having
financing. And that is quintessentially economic in the way that
things like Lopez and Morrison are not. [pause] And that's the
limit. So we're not here standing before you and saying that
Congress should be able to force people to buy things. We're . . .
GRAHAM (interrupting): I'm having trouble seeing the limits but
I accept your answer.141
As it turned out, Judge Graham "accept[ed]" Katyal's answer only in the sense that
he agreed to disagree. In his dissent from the Sixth Circuit's ruling sustaining the
ACA, he wrote that if "the mandate is upheld, it is difficult to see what the limits on
Congress's Commerce Clause authority would be."l 42 As tempting as it might be
to dismiss the Graham-Katyal dialogue with analogies to ships in darkness, it would
be a mistake to do so. The exchange reveals the fabric of constitutional Newspeak
fraying under stress. Graham asked Katyal to describe what lay beyond Congress's
grasp, given that all things under the sun could potentially be characterized as
"economic." 1 43 Katyal answered that Congress was precluded from regulating
whatever was not economic, a category Graham's question explicitly supposed, and
which Katyal must have in any event known, to be an empty one. They used the
same words, but gave them incompatible meanings. Graham asked in "Oldspeak";
Katyal answered him in Newspeak.

In a characteristically colorful 1993 concurring opinion, Justice Scalia once
likened the Court's intermittent invocation of its landmark, albeit much-maligned,
Establishment Clause precedent, Lemon v. Kurtzman,144 to "some ghoul in a latenight horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after
being repeatedly killed and buried.,,145 Scalia explained that the secret of the
precedent's survival was "that it [was] so easy to kill."l46 Lemon's malleable

141. Id.
142. Thomas More Law Center, 651 F.3d at 573 (Graham, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
143. Id. (Judge Graham's skepticism of the efficacy of an economic/non-economic distinction was only

too reasonable in the wake of Gonzales v. Raich.).
144. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
145. Lamb's Chapel v. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring
in judgment).
146. Id. at 399.
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standard was available for his colleagues when it conveniently produced a result
they desired but could just as conveniently be ignored when it suggested an
outcome they found less attractive. As Scalia wryly observed, "[s]uch a docile and
useful monster is worth keeping around, at least in a somnolent state; one never
knows when one might need him."1 47 One might similarly ponder why the
Commerce Clause ghoul has remained so hearty, apparently impervious to decades'
neglect? The claim of a need for a limit on congressional authority, however
transparently fallacious when invoked, nevertheless will not rest in peace. The
concluding part of this essay ventures some explanations for this macabre feature of
our constitutional condition.
II. Decoding Newspeak
The discussion so far has demonstrated that for over one hundred years the
there-must-be-a-limit argument has flowered in one case, only to be cut down in the
next, only to emerge again in a future term of the Court like some stubbornly
perennial weed. This cycle has recurred so frequently as to make the contemporary
invocation of the argument literally incredible. Yet this argument at least ostensibly
figured decisively in the case against the constitutionality of the ACA's individual
mandate, ultimately securing the support of a Supreme Court majority. This essay
now considers what this apparent contradiction suggests about the longer-term
significance of the ACA litigation and judicial enforcement of federalism more
generally.
A. Not a Revived FederalismRevival

Both friends and enemies of the Rehnquist Court's Lopez and Morrison
decisions have already suggested that National Federation of Independent

Businesses may foretell future efforts on the part of the Roberts Court to
reinvigorate the two earlier decisions.148 When considered against the historical
record, this understanding of the case seems ill-founded.149 For better or worse,
that history impeaches the Court's implied promise to reign in congressional power.
It is beyond credulous to think that after a century of self-defeating fits and
starts the Court is now finally willing and able to impose and enforce meaningful
limits on congressional authority. For the first half of the twentieth century, the
Court repeatedly asserted some role in policing the outer boundaries of the
Commerce Clause, along with other explicit grants of power to Congress. But as
often is the case, when confronted with a federal statute a majority of the Justices
deemed beneficial, the Court abandoned all concern with the limits of congressional
147. Id.
148. See, e.g., Randy Barnett, We Lost. But the Constitution Didn't. WASH. POST, July 3, 2012, at B 116
("The Supreme Court has definitively ruled that the commerce, necessary and proper clause, and spending
power have limits."); Neal K. Katyal, A Pyrrhic Victory, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2012, at A25 ("The health care
decision [] contains the seeds for a potential restructuring of federal-state relations.").
149. See supra notes 62-111 and accompanying text.
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power to uphold the law.1 50 Then, between 1942 and 1995, the Justices, and
eventually the legal profession more generally, honored the spirit of the New Deal
settlement, whereby Congress would be the judge of the scope of its own authority,
at least where the object of regulation was in some sense economic. 151 Lopez and
Morrison reflected the Rehnquist Court's attempt to make meaningful this last
reservation on congressional power.152 But even that modest effort foundered the
first time the Court encountered a federal statute dividing the American political
right-wing's social conservative and libertarian constituencies.is3 For more than a
century, the Court has again and again failed to field a reliable majority consistently
committed to limiting the powers of Congress. Nothing about the five-justice
consensus in National FederationofIndependent Businesses provides any reason to

expect the future to be different.
This is not to say that the Court will never again invalidate a federal statute on
the grounds that it exceeds the enumerated powers. What is certain, however, is
that on the exceedingly rare occasions in which it may do so, the result will depend
not on any principled limit to congressional jurisdiction but instead on some other,
likely unspoken, objection to the condemned federal law. Some might speculate
that even such a sporadic and indeterminate enforcement of the enumerated powers
scheme is better than none. 154 But such a regime would in effect accord unelected,
unaccountable, unrepresentative, life-tenured federal judges an occasional veto over
federal statutes they disliked for reasons they need never even articulate, let alone
defend. The ideological distortion worked upon the ordinary political process
could, as the ACA litigation itself suggests, have enormous consequences utterly at
odds with the most fundamental principles of representative government. 155 Only
the predisposed could possibly believe that whatever minimal, haphazard constraint
such an approach imposed upon Congress would not be more than counterbalanced
by the awesome and indeterminate authority conferred upon the Supreme Court.
Such a distribution of power could hardly be thought to serve the purported
objective of "limited government."' 56
The contrast between the Raich and the National Federation of Independent

Business cases illustrates the point. Although the Court's membership changed in
the interim, in both cases Justice Kennedy played a pivotal role.1 57 What explains
150. See supra notes 71-83 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 84-97 and accompanying text.
152. See supra notes 98-106 and accompanying text.
153. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 1 (2005); see also supra notes 107-111 and accompanying text.
154. Cf Richard A. Epstein, The Federalism Decisions of Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor:Is Halfa
LoafEnough?, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1793, 1825-26 (2006) (applauding the eponymous Justices even though their
efforts were sorely incomplete).
155. In addition, undisciplined judicial enforcement of the enumerated powers scheme obscures
responsibility, and thus electoral accountability, for the encroachment of federal power on the traditional
domains of state governments. See Graglia, supra note 95, at 770 (noting that a "major advantage of making
the Court's withdrawal from Commerce Clause review explicit is that it would put responsibility for the
expansion of federal power where it belongs, squarely on Congress").
156. See, e.g., Br. of Private Resp'ts at 12, Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 2566
(No. 11-398) (explaining that the enumerated powers scheme protects against "substantively unchecked
government").
157. Justice Kennedy was indispensable to the bare majorities, joining Justice Stevens's opinion for the
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his endorsement of federal power in the former case but not the latter? One would
search the U.S. reports in vain for any explanation of his decision to abandon his
fellow federalists in Raich.
But nonetheless, the mystery is easily solved.
Justice Kennedy has earned a reputation as an ardent supporter of drug
prohibition, 159 but in other ways has demonstrated what have been termed
"libertarian"'1 60 leanings, in both the sociall61 and economicl62 spheres. While
these preferences have been pretty thoroughly excised from the judicial opinions he
has authored, they left tracks in his questioning at oral argument. Justice
Kennedy's "deportment" and tone at oral arguments in Raich and other drug cases
transparently reflected that he had "little tolerance, judicial or otherwise, for those
who use drugs or who resist drug control measures." 1 63 Nor was it difficult to
deduce his views on the ACA's individual mandate, which during oral argument he
characterized as an "unprecedented" alteration of "the relation of the individual to
the government."1 64
The skeptical might question whether a congressional requirement that an adult
purchase insurance sufficient to guarantee payment for their own future health care
costs or forfeit a relatively modest monetary penalty1 65 really worked a greater
intrusion upon either individual liberty or federalism values than a federal statute
criminalizing Angel Raich's non-commercial use of marijuana, which both she and
her doctor thought indispensable to her efforts to mitigate her physical suffering and
which California had chosen to permit.166 Be that as it may, one need not reject
Justice Kennedy's priorities to see that they find no grounding in constitutional text,
Court in Raich, 545 U.S. at 1, and Chief Justice Roberts's opinion on the Commerce Clause issue in N.F.I.B.
v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2578 (2012) (No. 11-398).
158. Justice Kennedy was the only Justice to vote with the majorities in both Lopez and Raich who did
not to write a separate opinion. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 4.
159. See Ernest Young, Just Blowing Smoke?: Politics, Doctrine, and the Federalist Revival After
Gonzales v. Raich, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 7 (observing that Justice Kennedy "is well known for his hostility to
drug use"); see also Ilya Shapiro, A Faint-HeartedLibertarianat Best: The Sweet Mystery ofJustice Anthony
Kennedy, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 333, 355-58 (2010) (reviewing HELEN J. KNOWLES, THE TIE GOES TO
FREEDOM: JUSTICE ANTHONY M. KENNEDY ON LIBERTY (2009) (describing Justice Kennedy's approach in
drug cases).
160. See, e.g., HELEN J. KNOWLES, THE TIE GOES TO FREEDOM: JUSTICE ANTHONY M. KENNEDY ON
LIBERTY 2-5 (2009).
161. Cf Lino A. Graglia, Lawrence v. Texas: Our Philosopher-Kings Adopt Libertarianism as our
Official NationalPhilosophy and Reject TraditionalMorality as a Basisfor Law, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1139, 1140
(2004) (highlighting Justice Kennedy's libertarian stance on anti-sodomy laws).
162. Jeffrey Rosen, Economic Freedoms and the Constitution, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 13, 15 (2012)
(describing Justice Kennedy as "the libertarian justice most sympathetic" to "economic judicial activism").
163. Lyle Denniston, Commentary: Justice Kennedy and the "War on
Drugs," SCOTUS BLOG (June 6, 2005, 8:30 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2005/06/commentary-justicekennedy-and-the-war-on-drugs; see also Randy Barnett, The Ninth Circuit'S [sic] Revenge: In Gonzales v.
Raich, the Circuit Court Won Big, NAT'L REV. ONLINE (June 9, 2005, 7:41 AM),
http://old.nationalreview.com/comment/bamett200506090741 (asserting that Justice Kennedy's "deportment"
at oral argument in Raich supported the theory that his vote was based on extreme antipathy for illegal drugs).
164. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 35, at 11-12; see also Rosen, supra note 162, at 15
(discussing Justice Kennedy's openness to "economic judicial activism").
165. Cf Michael Cooper, Conservatives Sowed Idea of Health Care Mandate, Only to Spurn it Later,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2012, at Al5.
166. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 5 (2005).
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history, or case law. Nor need one conclude that Justice Kennedy, or indeed
though to be sure at a
anyone else wearing a black robe, acted in bad faith,
minimum the ACA litigation illustrates the remarkable human capacity for selfserving self-deception.168 But when the Court keeps two sets of constitutional
books, a Justice has little choice but to fall back on such extra-constitutional
preferences when choosing which of the ledgers to consult.
B. The Hardiness ofNewspeak

The more fundamental question raised by the ACA litigation is: why has the
Court so stubbornly refused to acknowledge its unwillingness or inability to enforce
the enumerated powers scheme? As noted throughout, at numerous points in the
evolution of the various suits, the longing of the government lawyers and, in their
turn, the lower court judges, to announce that the emperor had no clothes became
palpable.169
What accounts for such intractable professional duplicity? In part, this
stubbornness no doubt reflects the sheer courage and will required to proclaim the
death, at least insofar as courts are concerned, of a principle so obviously central to
our constitutional text, history, structure, and early case law as the enumerated
powers scheme. Even though the Constitution of 1787 unmistakably restricted
out of an abundance of caution this
Congress to the powers therein "granted,"
inescapable inference was made explicit in the Tenth Amendment four years
later. 17 1 Nor could anyone with even a passing knowledge of the debates in and
around the state ratifying conventions be unaware that friends and foes alike
conceded that the new central government's powers would be limited to those
enumerated.172 The greatest constitutional clashes in the young republic's early
to, those powersl73 and the protection of
years concerned the extent of, and limits
74
the powers "reserved to the States."1
In short, at least for most of the nation's history, to deny that Congress's
enumerated powers were limited would have amounted to a confession that at least
to this extent paeans to the majesty of the written Constitution were just so much
patriotic Newspeak. To be sure, in the late twentieth century some constitutional

167. See Dan M. Kahan, "Ideology in" or "Cultural Cognition of' Judging: What Difference Does It
Make?, 92 MARQ. L. REV. 413, 417 (2009) (noting that judges might "sincerely bas[e] their decisions on their
views of the law," but that "what they understand the law to require might be shaped by their valuesoperating not as resources for theorizing law, but as subconscious, extralegal influences on their perception of
legally consequential facts").
168. Cf id.
169. See supra notes 118, 142 and accompanying text.
170. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 12.
171. U.S. CONST., amend. X.
172. See JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE
CONSTITUTION 191-98 (1996); see generally PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE
CONSTITUTION: 1787-88 (2011).

173. See McAFFEE, ET AL., supra note 83, at 65-92.
174. U.S. Const., amend. X. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819).
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scholars freely admitted as much.175 But it should perhaps not be all that surprising
that practicing lawyers, judges, and justices found it harder to take that step.176 Of
course, the real question was not necessarily the continuing authority of the
enumerated powers scheme, let alone the written Constitution. All that was really
in issue was whether the judiciary had any role in enforcing the limitation of
Congress to its enumerated powers. As early as 1824, Chief Justice Marshall,
writing for the Court in Gibbons v. Ogden,'77 acknowledged the awesome sweep of
Congress's Commerce Clause power, adding:
The wisdom and the discretion of Congress, their identity with the
people, and the influence which their constituents possess at
elections, are, in this, as in many other instances, as that, for
example, of declaring war, the sole restraints on which they have
relied, to secure them from its abuse.178
Yet, perhaps out of an institutional self-interest in preserving the myth that the
Constitution means what judges say it does, 179 the Justices have been exceedingly
reluctant to admit that there might be constitutional principles altogether beyond
their keen. so As we have seen, these contending pressures produced a legal regime
in which it was an open secret that the Court had extricated itself from the dilemma
of identifying the outer boundaries of congressional authority.' 8'
But if this secret equilibrium was so widely known, why and how did it become
unstable? One lesson seems clear: the wages of constitutional duplicity include
increased uncertainty and the resulting hazard of opportunistic judicial behavior.
This danger was enhanced by professional, if not also judicial, ignorance of
Commerce Clause history. To be sure, few lawyers are unfamiliar with the Court's
retreat from any effort to limit congressional power during the period stretching
from 1937 to 1995. But the four-decade failure predating the New Deal settlement
is, unfortunately, less well known. This forgetfulness is reflected in the relatively
wide appeal of the there-must-be-a-limit argument and the rarity with which this
claim was refuted by reference to the utter failure of this same notion a century
before. One hope for this piece is that it will marginally increase professional
familiarity with the lessons that experience provides, perhaps to the end that past
mistakes need not be repeated (or more to the point, tolerated).
Yet another lesson taught by the ACA litigation is that much confidence in the
non-partisan purity of judicial decision-making is demonstrably misplaced.
Whether self-consciously or not, judges and especially justices see disputes through
175. See Frickey, supra note 96, at 701.
176. Such honesty would certainly be "brutal." See supranotes 89-92 and accompanying text.
177. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
178. Id at 197 (emphasis added).
179. See CHARLES E. HUGHES, ADDRESSES OF CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 185 (1908) (speech of May 3,
1907).
180. See Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme Than Court? The Rise and Fall of the Political Question
Doctrineand the Rise ofJudicialSupremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 237, 260 (2002).
181. See supra notes 84-97 and accompanying text.
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their ideological lenses no less than other more openly partisan political actors. 182
How else does one explain the way in which the case cleaved the federal judiciary
along such starkly partisan lines?183 One might forgive some impatience on the
part of conservative jurists and commentators with this critique. For a generation,
they have railed, until recently in vain, against the commitment of divisive and
debatable disputes to the resolution of federal judges according to theories of
constitutional meaning with at best highly attenuated connection to constitutional
text, history, or precedent.184 Yet, however tempting a "turn-about-is-fair-play"
jurisprudence might be, its indulgence can only prove destructive to rule of law
values.186 On the other hand, the American jurisprudential left is ill-situated to
attack such usurpations, having celebrated an unbridled conception of judicial
authority when better represented on the Supreme Court.187 One can only hope that
the ACA's narrow escape will provoke a long overdue introspection about the perils
of unconstrained judicial power.
III. Conclusion
On June 28, 2012, the Supreme Court avoided a catastrophe by the narrowest
of margins. For the continued vitality of the health care insurance reform, no doubt
many are thankful. But it would be a grave error to conclude that the episode
confirms the good health of our constitutional order. To the contrary, the Court's
resolution of the Commerce Clause question is symptomatic of an acute malady.
This is not because the ruling is likely to prove the first of many decisions
narrowing the scope of congressional authority. Only a willful blindness to the
long history of ebb and flow in the Court's dedication to federalism could permit
such an expectation at this late date.
Rather, the Court's Commerce Clause conclusion is troubling because it
demonstrates the inability of federal judges to rise above their own partisan
sympathies. This ideological taint is both facilitated and exacerbated by the Court's
loud persistence in the use of constitutional Newspeak. Most pertinently here, the
Court regularly recites the fiction that congressional power is subject to meaningful,
judicially enforceable limits. Perhaps attention to this aspect of the ACA litigation
will finally produce some genuine commitment to judicial candor, humility, and
self-restraint. Or perhaps we will just say as much without really meaning it. In
182. See A. Christopher Bryant, ConstitutionalForbearance,46 U. RICH. L. REV. 695, 698-703 (2012).
183. Seven of the eight Democratic appointees to rule on the merits of the Commerce Clause issue voted
to uphold the ACA; ten of the twelve Republican appointees rejected the claim that the Commerce Clause
authorized the Act.
184. See Richard A. Posner, In Defense of Looseness, THE NEW REPUBLiC, Aug. 27, 2008, at 33
(describing and criticizing a perspective that would conclude that because "[1]iberal judges have used loose
construction to expand constitutional prohibitions beyond any reasonable construal of original meaning" that
"now it is the conservatives' tum").
185. Id.
186. See Bryant, supra note 182, at 702-03.
187. Cf Pushaw, supra note I11, at 586 (noting that "liberal Democrats who had applauded the Court for
inventing new political rights under the Equal Protection Clause lambasted the Bush v. Gore majority for
doing exactly the same thing").
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either case, we will no doubt in due course learn to love the ACA decision.
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